Alternative Remedies in Minority Partners\u27 Suits on Partnership Causes of Action by Hubbard, Helen
SMU Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 5 Article 4
1985
Alternative Remedies in Minority Partners' Suits on
Partnership Causes of Action
Helen Hubbard
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Helen Hubbard, Alternative Remedies in Minority Partners' Suits on Partnership Causes of Action, 39 Sw L.J. 1021 (1985)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol39/iss5/4
COMMENTS
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES IN MINORITY
PARTNERS' SUITS ON PARTNERSHIP
CAUSES OF ACTION
by Helen Hubbard
AMES Cates had a minority partnership interest in two partnerships
organized under the Texas Uniform Partnership Act,' SanJac Associa-
tion and SanJac International. The partnerships designed, marketed,
and managed multiple employers' trusts and insurance plans that enabled
small employers to enjoy the benefits of group insurance. Under contracts
with the partnerships ITT Life Insurance Company2 and specified under-
writers of Lloyds of London, Ltd. served as insurers and reinsurers, respec-
tively. In January 1979 ITT Life and Lloyds elected to cancel the contracts
in accordance with their terms. After completing the administrative han-
dling of claims that had arisen before the contract cancellations, the partner-
ships became inactive and virtually insolvent.
In September 1979 Cates filed suit on behalf of himself, SanJac Associa-
tion, and SanJac International, against ITT Life and Lloyds, alleging breach
of contract, fraudulent intent not to perform the contracts, and violations of
the Clayton and Sherman Anti-Trust Acts.3 The defendants contended that
Cates did not have authority to sue on behalf of the partnerships. Cates's
partners, after settling individually with the defendants, refused to join as
plaintiffs or to consent to suit in the partnership name. Cates alleged that his
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970) [hereinafter referred to in the
text as the Texas Act]. The Texas Act is based on the Uniform Partnership Act. Bromberg,
Source and Comments, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § I (Vernon 1970).
2. Certain affiliates of ITT Life Insurance Company and other related corporations also
constituted parties to the contracts. References to ITT Life also apply to these affiliates and
related corporations.
3. The Fifth Circuit's opinion, and apparently the plaintiffs' complaint, merely refer to
violations of "the Clayton and Sherman Anti-Trust Acts" by "tie-in" provisions in the con-
tracts and by efforts to eliminate or reduce competition from the plaintiffs. Cates v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985). Courts frequently invalidate
tying arrangements based on either Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), or Clayton Act
§ 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTI-
TRUST 431-40 (1977) (discussion of tying arrangements under Sherman Act § I and Clayton
Act § 3). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that contracts that restrain trade are illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 thus implements the antitrust laws' goal of enhancing competi-
tion. L. SULLIVAN, supra, at 13-14.
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partners had conspired with the defendants to refuse to participate in the
suit based on selfish concerns for their individual interests and the possible
effects of the suit on their futures in the insurance industry. Cates alterna-
tively requested: (1) appointment of a receiver for the partnerships; (2) per-
mission to sue for his proportionate share of the partnerships' claims; or
(3) deferral of the action until he could withdraw from the partnerships and
sue individually after receiving his share of the partnerships' assets, includ-
ing the partnerships' claims against the defendants.
The district court dismissed the suits in which the partnerships were
plaintiffs solely on the basis of the long-established Texas rule that a partner
cannot sue individually on a partnership contract. 4 The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because it found that
Cates had no individual cause of action for individual losses, resulting from
diminution in value of his partnership interest or his loss of partnership prof-
its. After perfecting an appeal and filing initial briefs in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Cates died.
In Cates v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. 5 the Fifth Circuit
permitted substitution of Cates's widow in her capacity as independent exec-
utrix of his estate, but found that Mrs. Cates did not succeed to Cates's
managerial rights in the partnerships or to his rights in specific partnership
property. 6 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, did not decide whether Cates could
have maintained the suits on the partnerships' causes of action.
The court, however, further held that when some partners wrongfully im-
pede a suit on a well-grounded partnership cause of action, Texas law would
provide a remedy for a minority partner plaintiff in addition to an action for
damages or accounting against the nonsuing partners, at least when tradi-
tional remedies do not adequately protect the plaintiff partner's substantive
rights.7 Wrongful impediment exists when the nonsuing partners fail to base
their actions on good faith beliefs regarding the best interests of the partner-
ship. 8 The court remanded the case to the district court for consideration of
whether this fact situation justified: (1) permitting Mrs. Cates to sue on the
partnerships' cause of action, either derivatively or for Cates's proportionate
share; or (2) deferring the action until appointment of a receiver or dissolu-
tion of the partnerships, after which Mrs. Cates might have a share of the
partnerships' causes of action. 9
This Comment reviews the currently available and potentially available
4. Speake v. Prewitt, 6 Tex. 252, 257 (1851); see infra notes 24-25 and accompanying
text.
5. 756 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1985).
6. Id. at 1173-74. See Texas Act § 28-B(I)(B) which provides that the successors in
interest of a deceased partner constitute assignees of the partnership interest. TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 28-B(1)(B) (Vernon 1970). Under Texas Act § 27(1) assignment
does not permit the assignee to participate in partnership management. Id. art. 6132b, § 27(1).
In addition, a deceased partner's right to specific partnership property vests in the surviving
partners under Texas Act § 25(2)(d). Id. art. 6132b, § 25(2)(d). See 756 F.2d at 1173-75.
7. 756 F.2d at 1178.
8. Id. at 1177.
9. Id. at 1180.
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remedies for individual partners. The currently available remedies include
the equitable remedies of accounting and dissolution. As background for a
discussion of potentially available remedies, this Comment also reviews the
legal limitations on partnership actions under common law, the Uniform
Partnership Act,' 0 and modem procedural rules. Finally, this Comment re-
views the development of the derivative suit as an additional remedy in
trusts, corporations, and limited partnerships and suggests that, in appropri-
ate circumstances, a derivative action should also serve in a general partner-
ship organized under the Act.
I. EQUITABLE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL PARTNER
The Act provides two remedies for a dissatisfied partner. He may, under
certain limited circumstances, either compel an accounting 1 or request dis-
solution of the partnership under a court order.
12
A. Action for Accounting
Section 22 of the Act provides that a partner has a right to receive an
accounting of the partnership's business when: (1) the other partners imper-
missibly preclude his participation in partnership affairs or his possession of
partnership property; (2) an agreement entitles him to an accounting; (3) an-
other partner has violated his fiduciary duty; or (4) the facts make it fair and
logical. 13 A partner may enforce his right to receive an accounting by filing
an equitable action for an accounting. 14 Generally, in a continuing partner-
10. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 9 (1969) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the
Act and cited as U.P.A.]. The Act, promulgated in 1914, presently governs partnerships in 49
states. See id. at 1. The District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands have also adopted
the Act. Id. Louisiana has not adopted the Act. Instead, Louisiana continues to employ its
civil law concept, which recognizes partnerships as legal entities. See Trappey v. Lumber-
man's Mut. Casualty Co., 229 La. 632, 86 So. 2d 515, 516-17 (1956) (discussing Louisiana
partnership law). The Act has remained unchanged during the more than 70 years since its
adoption. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Considera-
tion of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5-
6 (1982).
11. U.P.A. § 22 (1914).
12. Id. § 32(1).
13. Id. § 22. See generally 1 J. BARRETT & E. SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS
LAW AND TAXATION 626-30 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 1 BARRETT] (discussing accounting
actions under common law and U.P.A. § 22); A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON
PARTNERSHIPS 409-14 (1968) (discussing accounting actions under U.P.A. § 22); H. REUS-
CHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 190
(1979) [hereinafter cited as REUSCHLEIN] (generally discussing right to accounting). Other
sections of the Act provide a right to an accounting under special circumstances. U.P.A. § 43
(1914) provides such a right against the surviving or winding-up partners as of the date of
dissolution. Id. § 27 provides that an assignee of a partnership interest may receive an ac-
counting at dissolution. Under id. § 21 all partners must account for any advantage that they
receive from any transaction connected with the partnership or its property. 1 BARRETT,
supra, at 629-30.
14. A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at 410. In an accounting action the court should con-
sider everything that affects the obligations between the partners. REUSCHLEIN, supra note 13,
at 281. An accounting action generally cannot include nonpartners as parties. Hecker, Lim-
ited Partners' Derivative Suits Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 343, 350 (1980).
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ship one partner may not sue any other partner on a cause of action arising
out of the partnership business until after an accounting. 15 An accounting
action, although in some ways a more powerful remedy than a derivative
suit, 16 may prove unsatisfactory if the partnership and the other partners
have insufficient assets to discharge the claim.t 7 In addition, because even a
successful suing partner cannot recover his attorney's fees, an accounting
action may prove impractical, particularly if the suing partner has a rela-
tively small interest in the partnership. 18
B. Dissolution Under Court Order
Section 32(1) of the Act provides that a partner has the right to request a
court-ordered dissolution when another partner has breached his fiduciary
duty and under certain other circumstances that make dissolution equita-
ble.19 If the court finds that one of the specified circumstances is present, it
generally must order the requested disssolution. 20 A dissolution usually
15. E.g., Staggers v. Vaughan, 527 S.W.2d 791, 793-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975,
writ refd n.r.e.) (also recognizing exception allowing suits on agreements to form partnership);
Rice v. Lamberg, 408 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christ 1966, no writ) (equita-
ble accounting action was proper remedy for suing partner); Amberson v. Horton, 255 S.W.2d
580, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (accounting action required
before action on other partnership claims, but failure to plead accounting constituted harmless
error under facts of case); see Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 53, 61 (W.D. La. 1951) (in
continuing partnership partner cannot sue another partner regarding a partnership transaction
in contract or tort), afl'd, 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
16. REUSCHLEIN, supra note 13, at 282. In a derivative suit, a shareholder must prove a
reasonable need, which may limit his access to corporate financial information. Furthermore,
the shareholder may encounter procedural difficulties, and the scope of the suit remains lim-
ited. An accounting action, on the other hand, includes an inquiry into all transactions. Id. at
282-83.
17. The partnership may have insufficient assets if its assets are in the hands of nonpart-
ners who are not subject to joinder in an accounting action or to suit by an individual partner
because only the partnership can sue on the partnership cause of action against the nonpartner.
Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1480
(1965).
18. Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D.2d 333, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258 (1966).
19. U.P.A. § 32(1) (1914) provides:
On application by or for a partner the court shall decree a dissolution whenever:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial proceeding or is
shown to be of unsound mind,
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing his part of
the partnership contract,
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially
the carrying on of the business,
(d) A partner wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership
agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partner-
ship business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in
partnership with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
The purchaser of another partner's partnership interest may also seek a judicial dissolution
under id. § 32(2). Id. § 31 provides causes of nonjudicial dissolution. See generally Bromberg,
Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEX. L. REV. 631, 633-37
(1965) (discussing and categorizing judicial and nonjudicial causes of dissolution).
20. See Bromberg, supra note 19, at 639 (statutory language not discretionary, but court
[Vol. 391024
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ends the partnership business, 21 causing a loss of the going concern value. 22
In addition a dissolution action does not provide compensation for prior
losses23 and, like an accounting action, may thus prove to be an unsatisfac-
tory remedy.
II. A GENERAL PARTNER'S LEGAL REMEDIES
A. Common Law Rule Regarding Partnership Actions
Courts commonly hold that without specific statutory authorization part-
nerships cannot litigate in the partnership name. 24 The corollary to this
general common law rule requires naming all partners as plaintiffs in suits
for injury to the partnerships. 25 Conflicts exist regarding the historical basis
and modern justification for the common law rule.
Early decisions denied partners' attempts to sue in the partnership name
because such suits constituted an expropriation of the sovereign power to
grant corporate franchises. 26 Courts have also rejected suits in the partner-
may avoid grant of dissolution by construction of the more broadly stated circumstances enti-
tling partner to request court-ordered dissolution or by application of equitable principles).
21. A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at 419. The Act provides that any partner may force
liquidation of the partnership business after a dissolution occurs. U.P.A. § 38(1) (1914). The
partners may avoid such forced liquidation by an advance continuation agreement. A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 13, at 419. A partner who shows cause may have the court wind up the
partnership business. U.P.A. § 37(1) (1914).
22. See Hillman, supra note 10, at 35 (loss of going concern value may make dissolution
unsatisfactory remedy).
23. Hecker, supra note 14, at 349.
24. A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at 327; Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties
to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383, 383 (1924); see, e.g., Rose v. Beckham, 264 Ala. 209, 86 So. 2d
275, 277 (1956) (suits in partnership name not allowed); International Harvester Co. of Am. v.
Clements-Middleton Co., 35 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1931, no writ) (part-
ners cannot sue in firm name even if individual partners are named in description of firm);
Houghton v. Puryear, 30 S.W. 583, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-1895, no writ) (partnership cannot
sue in partnership name). See generally infra text accompanying notes 56-70 (discussing pro-
cedural changes to allow suits in common name).
25. A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at 327; Sturges, supra note 24, at 384; see, e.g., Zion v.
Sentry Safety Control Corp., 258 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1958) (individual partner cannot sue
individually on partnership cause of action); Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194
F.2d 469, 472-73 (6th Cir. 1952) (all partners having interest in partnership debt constitute
indispensable parties); Godwin v. Vinson, 251 N.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1959) (single
partner cannot sue individually on partnership cause of action); Roberson v. McIlhenny,
Hutchins & Co., 59 Tex. 615, 618 (1883) (naming of all partners as plaintiffs required in ac-
tions by partnership); Speake v. Prewitt, 6 Tex. 252, 257 (1851) (same); Morris v. Gwaltney,
215 S.W. 473, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1919, no writ) (no recovery available on partner-
ship claim because original suit filed by one partner as sole plaintiff); Allen v. Fleck, 118 S.W.
176, 176-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-1909, no writ) (all partners are necessary plaintiff parties in suit
for collection of debt due to partnership); Houghton v. Puryear, 30 S.W. 583, 584 (Tex. Civ.
App.-1 895, no writ) (all partners must join in action to recover for conversion of partnership
property).
26. Sturges, supra note 24, at 404-05; see, e.g., American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Draw-
ers' & Die Makers' Unions Nos. 1 & 3, 90 F. 598, 600 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898) (an association
cannot sue or be sued in its common name because right to do so constitutes corporate
franchise, which only legislature can bestow); Richardson v. C.W. Smith & Co., 21 Fla. 336,
341 (1885) (government authorization required to grant exclusive corporate privilege of suing
in common name); Crawley v. American Soc'y of Equity of N. Am., 153 Wis. 13, 139 N.W.
734, 736 (1913) (government has exclusive capacity to bring corporations into being and en-
dow them with ability to sue).
1986] 1025
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ship name based on the nonentity status of partnerships. 27 Other courts
have rejected suits in a common name or suits by fewer than all partners to
protect third parties from possible multiple actions and judgments for dupli-
cate payments of the same obligation. 28 Courts have also rejected individual
partners' attempts to sue for their proportionate share of a partnership's
cause of action, but have not stated any rationale for their holdings.
29
B. Exceptions to the Common Law Rule Regarding Partnership Actions
Under the common law courts recognize four narrow exceptions to the
general rule that requires naming all partners as plaintiffs in suits for injury
to the partnership. First, if one partner contracts for the partnership in his
own name he can sue individually on that contract. 30 Second, the active
partners need not join dormant partners3 ' in a suit on a partnership claim.32
Third, in some jurisdictions if the defendant fails to request dismissal at the
beginning of an action filed by fewer than all partners, he waives the defect.
33
Fourth, some courts permit suit by fewer than all partners after requiring
27. A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at 331; see, e.g., Lister v. Vowell, 122 Ala. 264, 25 So.
564, 565 (1899) (partnerships are not natural or artificial persons and cannot sue in partnership
name); Aronovitz v. Stein Prop., 322 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (partnership is
not entity and thus cannot sue in the partnership name); Soper v. Clay City Lumber Co., 21
Ky. 933, 53 S.W. 267, 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 1899) (defendant was not legal or actual entity that
plaintiff could sue in firm name); Allgeier, Martin & Assocs. v. Ashmore, 508 S.W.2d 524, 525
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (same); Payne v. Livingston, 253 S.W. 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1923, no writ) (because partnership does not constitute a legal entity it can litigate only in
members' names).
Over 60 years ago one commentator suggested that the nonentity status rationale consti-
tuted a mere formula to effectuate the historical principle that allowing suits in the partnership
name constituted expropriation of the sovereign power to grant corporate franchises. This
commentator argued that the bare assertion of nonentity status does not justify denying the
power to sue in the partnership name and characterized the common law rule as an unneeded
procedural technicality. Sturges, supra note 24, at 405.
28. See Spiritas v. Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710, 714-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (general rule requiring suits for partnership causes of action in names of all
partners does not apply when both partners are parties, one as plaintiff and the other as de-
fendant, because purpose of rule is to protect others from multiple actions); Edmondson v.
Carroll, 65 S.W.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1933, writ dism'd) (purpose of
general rule is protection of third parties from multiple actions and payments).
29. See Vinal v. West Va. Oil & Oil Land Co., 110 U.S. 215, 215 (1884) (individual part-
ner cannot sue for his proportionate part of partnership debt in individual action); Anable v.
McDonald Land & Mining Co., 144 Mo. App. 303, 128 S.W. 38, 41 (1910) (one partner can-
not sue for his part of partnership debt).
30. Cleaveland v. Heidenheimer, 92 Tex. 108, 46 S.W. 30, 32 (1898) (partner entering
contract in his own name for partnership or subject to ratification by partnership can sue in his
name alone, or all the partners can sue on contract together); Rock Creek Oil Corp. v. Wolfe,
35 S.W.2d 1072, 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930, writ dism'd) (if partner enters contract
for his partnership in his name he can sue on the contract alone).
31. A dormant partner shares in profits, but hides his identity. Speake v. Prewitt, 6 Tex.
252, 258 (1851).
32. Id.; Miller v. White, 112 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, writ dism'd);
American Nat'l Bank v. Haggerton, 250 S.W. 279, 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, no
writ).
33. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Cal. 1958), a ffd on
other grounds, 330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'don other grounds, 382 U.S. 54 (1965); Hutch-
inson v. Dubois, 45 Mich. 143, 7 N.W. 714, 716 (1881). But see Allgeier, Martin & Assocs. v.
Ashmore, 508 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (where no statutory authority permitted
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joinder of the nonsuing partner as a defendant. 34
C. The Aggregate and Entity Theories of Partnerships
The common law rule requiring joinder of all partners as plaintiffs in ac-
tions on partnership claims accords with, if it does not result from, the gen-
eral common law characterization of partnerships as aggregates of
individuals rather than as separate entities. 35 The conflict between the entity
and aggregate theories 36 of partnership may have originated with the first
partnership. A complete adoption of the aggregate theory results in difficul-
ties with property titles and creditors' claims. 37 A total acceptance of the
entity theory, including abolition of partners' individual liabilities, however,
would eliminate the distinctions between partnerships and corporations.
38
Neither the entity nor aggregate theory has, therefore, ever completely
prevailed. 39
D. The Uniform Partnership Act
The National Congress of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which
was responsible for drafting the Uniform Partnership Act, stated that it had
suits in partnership name, judgment for partnership suing in partnership name was reversed
because partnership does not constitute entity).
34. Howell v. Bartlett, 19 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1929, no writ); see
also Republic Supply Co. v. Colbert, 70 F.2d 586, 588 (10th Cir. 1934) (court noted common
law rule requiring naming of all partners as plaintiffs in suit on partnership cause of action, but
found rule was superseded by state statute providing for joinder of nonconsenting plaintiffs as
defendants).
35. See generally 1 A. WILLIS, J. PENNEL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
§ 2.04 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as 1 WILLIS]. (discussing historical background of ag-
gregate and entity theories). The very early English common law generally adopted the aggre-
gate theory of partnerships. The procedural difficulties inherent in the early English common
law, however, spurred development of the medieval law of merchants. Id. The law merchant,
controlled in its beginning by distinct courts that were often composed of merchants, 1 Z.
CAvITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 11.01[3] (1985), includes common practices of
merchants that the courts have occasionally ratified. 4 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
512 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone 4th ed. 1973). During the early 1600s the English
common law courts absorbed the law merchant, including some of its theories of partnership
management. 1 WILLIS, supra, § 2.04. Because the common law and equitable principles that
encompass the law merchant control in situations that are not dealt with in the Act, U.P.A.
§ 5 (1914), the law merchant retains a strong influence on partnership law. The common law
did not, however, incorporate the law merchant's entity theory of partnerships. 1 Z. CAVITCH,
supra, § 11.0113].
36. The final drafter of the Act, Dean William Draper Lewis of the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School, stated that:
The [entity] theory is, that when two or more persons form a partnership, the
law should regard the association as having a legal personality distinct from the
individual legal personalities of each partner. Under this theory, all partnership
rights are vested in this legal personality of the partnership; on it are imposed all
partnership obligations. The partners are the agents of the legal entity.
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 639 (1915). Under the aggregate
theory "in partnership transactions the individual partners deal directly with each other and
with third persons." Id. See generally A. ARONSOHN, PARTNERSHIP INCOME TAXES 1-2 (7th
ed. 1978) (defining aggregate and entity theories).





elected to continue the common law aggregate theory in the Act.4° The
Act's definition of a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit" 4' reflects the Commissioners'
intention to continue the aggregate theory.4 2 Commentators and courts fre-
quently state that the Act adopted the aggregate theory.43
The Act, however, also includes features that are consistent with the en-
tity theory.44 Entity characteristics include: (1) ownership of real property
in the partnership name;45 (2) differentiation between partnership property
and an individual partner's interest in the partnership; 46 (3) inclusion of
40. U.P.A., Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 6 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1985). The English Part-
nership Act is also based on the aggregate theory. 1 BARRETT, supra note 13, at 153-54.
41. U.P.A. § 6(1) (1914).
42. The Commissioners originally chose an entity theory proponent, Dean Ames of
Harvard Law School, to draft the Act. 1 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 35, § 11.02[2]. Dean Ames
defined a partnership as "a legal person formed by the association of two or more individuals
for the purpose of carrying on business with a view to profit." Lewis, The Uniform Partnership
Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158, 165 (1915). Dean Ames's
definition might have prevailed had he lived to complete the drafting of the Act. I Z.
CAVITCH, supra note 35, § 11.02[2]. The second appointed drafter, Dean Lewis, thought it
might prove impossible to draft a satisfactory act using the entity theory. He, therefore, de-
cided to prepare alternate drafts under the two theories. After reviewing the alternate drafts,
members of a conference, including the Committee on Commercial Law, partnership scholars,
and lawyers specializing in partnerships, unanimously recommended that Dean Lewis draft
the Act under the aggregate theory. Dean Lewis implemented this recommendation. Lewis,
supra note 36, at 640; Lewis, supra, at 171-72.
Varying tax consequences represent the clearest difference between partnerships and corpo-
rations. Partnership tax rules offer significant advantages that may provide the reason for
choosing the partnership form. Comment, supra note 17, at 1466. Federal tax law reflects
problems in dealing with the entity and aggregate theories. The Internal Revenue Code origi-
nally viewed partnerships as entities with one important exception: in determining partners'
tax liabilities the Code viewed partnerships as aggregates. See Comment, Are Partnerships
Aggregates or Entities When Determining the Availability of Investment Credit for Used Prop-
erty?, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1013, 1013-14 (1978). Amendments that require partners to
account separately for various items have, however, shifted the balance of partnership tax law
to the aggregate theory. Wolfman, Level for Determining Character of Partnership Income-
"Entity" v. "Conduit" Principle in Partnership Taxation, 19 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 287, 288-89
(1961).
The partnership concept in the federal income tax laws encompasses associations that are
not generally referred to as partnerships, including "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or
other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any business, financial oper-
ation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a corporation
or a trust or estate." I.R.C. § 761(a) (1982). This expansive partnership definition further
complicates analysis of the nature of the partnership. A. ARONSOHN, supra note 36, at 3.
43. Eg., I BARRETT, supra note 13, at 153-55 (also noting that the Act contains elements
of the entity theory); I Z. CAVITCH, supra note 35, § 11.02[2] (same); Hecker, supra note 14, at
347-48 (same).
44. See generally I BARRETT, supra note 13, at 154-55 (discussing entity characteristics
and noting courts' inclination to apply entity theory more often); Jensen, Is a Partnership
Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377, 378-79
& n. 11 (1963) (citing 19 sections of the Act that recognize partnership as entity and concluding
that provisions emanate from work of Dean Ames's committee on early drafts).
45. U.P.A. § 8(3) (1914). The Act also provides that property acquired in the firm name
must be conveyed in the firm name. Id.
46. U.P.A. §§ 25-26 (1914). The Commissioners specifically excepted the ownership of
partnership property in a tenancy in partnership from their mandate of the aggregate theory.
U.P.A., Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 6 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1985).
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partnerships in the Act's definition of the term person;47 and (4) designation
of each partner as the partnership's agent.48  These entity characteristics
have led some commentators to conclude that, in spite of the expressed in-
tention of the Commissioners, the Act did not definitely adopt either the-
ory.49 Professor Alan R. Bromberg stated that the Act tends to follow the
entity theory. 50 Professor Bromberg also stated, in his comments on the
Texas Act,51 that the Texas Act has an even greater tendency toward the
entity theory than the Act.5 2
Although the Act's theoretical ambiguity continues to cause confusion
47. U.P.A. § 2 (1914).
48. Id. § 9(1).
49. A. ARONSOHN, supra note 36, at 2; Crane, Twenty Years Under the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, 2 U. PIr. L. REV. 129, 132 (1936); see E. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES
WITHOUT INCORPORATION 293-301 (1929) (discussing reasons for ambiguity in the Act); Jen-
sen, supra note 44, at 378-79 (uncertainty inherent due to inclusion of numerous substantive
entity provisions with an aggregate definition of partnerships). The State of Nebraska enacted
legislation to insure greater uniformity of treatment of partnerships. NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-
306(1) (1981) provides that "[a] partnership is an association of persons organized as a sepa-
rate entity to carry on a business for profit." Id. § 67-304(4) provides that the Nebraska
version of the Act "shall be interpreted and construed in harmony with the entity theory of
partnership." Oklahoma recognized partnerships as entities under the common law. Heaton v.
Schaefer, 34 Okla. 631, 126 P. 797, 798 (1912). Although Oklahoma adopted the Act's part-
nership definition, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 206(1) (West 1969), it continues to recognize
partnerships as entities under the Act. C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 450
P.2d 211, 214 (Okla. 1968).
50. Bromberg, supra note 1. See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at 26-29 (ration-
ale supporting dominance of entity theory in Act).
51. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970). The adoption of the Act in
Texas became effective January 1, 1962. Texas Uniform Partnership Act, ch. 158, § 45, 1961
Tex. Gen. Laws 289, 303. See generally Bromberg, Texas Uniform Partnership Act-The En-
acted Version, 15 Sw. L.J. 386 (1961) (discussing changes made in proposed Texas Act before
enactment); Bromberg, The Proposed Texas Uniform Partnership Act, 14 Sw. L.J. 437 (1960)
(discussing Uniform Partnership Act proposed by Dallas Bar Association Special Committee
on Uniform Partnership Act); Sher & Bromberg, Texas Partnership Law in the 20th Century-
Why Texas Should Adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, 12 Sw. L.J. 263 (1958) (discussing
Texas partnership common law and advocating adoption of the Act).
52. Bromberg, supra note 1, at 300. The Texas Act adds "unless the agreement between
the partners provides otherwise," TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 31(4) (Vernon
1970), to the Act's statement that dissolution results from "the death of any partner." U.P.A.
§ 31(4) (1914). Texas Act § 28-B requires treatment of the spouse of a partner receiving a
partnership interest on divorce and successors in interest to a deceased partner or a partner's
deceased spouse as assignees and purchasers of the partnership interest. TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 28-B (Vernon 1970). Texas Act § 27 allows assignees and purchas-
ers of partnership interests to obtain financial information regarding partnerships. Id. art.
6132b, § 27. Texas Act § 28-B(2) provides that the demise of a partner's spouse does not
result in dissolution, absent a provision in the partnership agreement requiring dissolution. Id.
art. 6132b, § 28-B(2). Section 15 of the Texas Act, however, provides that partners are jointly
and severally liable on contract claims for partnership debts, id. art. 6132b, § 15, although the
Act only provides joint liability on such claims. U.P.A. § 15 (1914). Professor Bromberg also
suggests that courts use the entity theory to decide questions not specifically dealt with in the
Texas Act. Bromberg, supra note 1, at 301. See Haney v. Fenley, Bate, Deaton & Porter, 618
S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex. 1981) (under the Texas Act a partnership is usually treated as a legal
entity); Corinth Joint Venture v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 667 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1984, writ dism'd) (quoting Haney, 618 S.W.2d at 542); Seidman & Seidman v.
Schwartz, 665 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ dism'd) (quoting Haney,
618 S.W.2d at 542).
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and litigation,5 3 it is clear that a partnership may constitute an entity for
some purposes and an aggregate for other purposes.5 4 The drafters of the
Act did not include any provisions to simplify the difficulties involved in
partnership litigation under the common law rules. 55 Under the Act, the
common law aggregate theory continues to apply in determining questions
regarding partnership litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
many states, however, now have separate provisions that permit partnerships
to litigate in the partnership name. 56
E. Revised Procedural Rules
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) allows suit by a partnership in the
partnership name to enforce a claim arising under the Constitution or a fed-
eral statute.57 The rule, however, relates only to procedure and does not
affect the substantive law regarding partnerships. 58 The rule thus does not
change the common law rule that one partner cannot bring suit on a partner-
ship cause of action. 59
53. Jensen, supra note 44, at 379; see A. ARONSOHN, supra note 36, at 1; 1 BARRETT,
supra note 13, at 151.
54. Jensen, supra note 44, at 381, 384; see Hecker, supra note 14, at 347-48 (courts do not
have to make an all-or-nothing determination regarding partnership classification).
55. 1 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 35, § 11.02[2]; Jensen, supra note 44, at 379; see Aronovitz
v. Stein Prop., 322 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (the Act did not permit suits in
partnership name); Allgeier, Martin &Assocs. v. Ashmore, 508 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974) (the Act "did not transform a partnership into a separate or juristic entity"). In contract
cases Professors Wright and Miller find support for continuation of the common law proce-
dural rules in the Act's theories of liability. Professors Wright and Miller reason that:
The Uniform Partnership Act states that the liability of partners for an obliga-
tion based on a contract entered into by the partnership is a joint liability of all
the partners. Therefore, under the act all partners theoretically are indispensa-
ble parties in an action against the partnership and must be joined. Conversely,
all partners should join in asserting a partnership claim under a contract.
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1613, at 131 (1972)
(footnotes omitted). Professors Wright and Miller also note a trend toward modification of the
strict rules regarding joinder of all partners in suits against partnerships by changing the liabil-
ity rule to joint and several liability, thereby allowing suits against fewer than all partners, or
through rules allowing suits against partnerships in the partnership name. Id. at 132-33.
56. 1 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 35, § 11.02[2]; see REUSCHLEIN, supra note 13, at 312
(statutes allowing suit in partnership name are common, and where such statutes apply, part-
nership appears similar to entity). But see Bedolla v. Logan & Frazier, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118,
127, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 66 (1975) (although limited partnership can be sued in partnership
name, it does not constitute legal entity).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). In all other suits in federal court state law controls the part-
nership's capacity to sue. Id.; see Remington's Dairy v. Rutland Ry. Corp., 15 F.R.D. 488,
489 (D. Vt. 1954) (court applied rule 17(b) to allow Rhode Island partnership to sue in firm
name in federal court under Vermont statute).
58. 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS
§ 487, at 55-56 (1961).
59. See Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933, 935-36 (S.D. Cal. 1958), affd
on other grounds, 330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 54 (1965),
commented on in 73 HARV. L. REV. 411 (1959) (rule 17(b) does not appear to relate to appor-
tionment between partners of authority to sue); see also Rosen v. Texas Co., 161 F. Supp. 55,
59 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (where individual partner sued in his own name on partnership claim
arising under federal statute, district court required joinder of other partners). But see Henson
v. First Sec. & Loan Co., 164 Wash. 198, 2 P.2d 85, 86 (1931). In Henson the court, citing
only 47 C.J. Partnership § 947 (1929), allowed one partner to sue in the partnership name on a
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Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28 also allows a partnership to sue or be
sued in the partnership name. 6° Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 815 provides,
however, that courts may not interpret the rules, including rule 28, to mod-
ify any substantive rights or duties of a plaintiff or defendant in a civil suit.61
Texas courts have held that, at a minimum, rule 28 requires according entity
status to a partnership with regard to enforcing a judgment against it or
obtaining a judgment for it. 6 2 The El Paso court of civil appeals held that
nothing in rule 28 requires naming individual partners in a suit by the part-
nership, 63 but noted that the court could require the partnership to release
partners' identities if necessary to protect the rights of the defendant.
64
In Spiritas v. Robinowitz65 the Dallas court of civil appeals stated that
courts developed the common law rule that requires naming all partners in
suits to enforce partnership rights in order to protect third parties from mul-
tiple suits. 66 The court thus found the common law rule inapplicable in a
partnership debt under the "general rule of law that it is within the implied power of a partner
to institute ordinary legal proceedings in behalf of a firm by using the names of all of the
parties as such as plaintiffs for the enforcement of the rights of the firm." Henson, 2 P.2d at 86.
The court also noted that the complaint did not state that the other partner objected to the
suit. Id. The defendant, however, did allege that the other partner would not have agreed to
become a plaintiff. Id.
60. TEX. R. Civ. P. 28 states that -[a]ny partnership ... may sue or be sued in its partner-
ship.., name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right, but on a motion
by any party or on the court's own motion the true name may be substituted." See generally 1
R. MACDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS §§ 3.06-.07
(rev. ed. 1981) (discussing partnership actions under common law and rule 28). A partnership
must file a certificate in each county in which it does business or has an office. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 36.10 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The certificate must state the partnership's
and the partners' names and addresses. Id. A partnership cannot bring suit in the partnership
name under rule 28 until it has filed the required certificate. Id. § 36.25; see 8 W. DORSANEO
& P. WINSHIP, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 180.06 (1985).
61. TEX. R. Civ. P. 815. Texas courts have held that rule 28 relates only to procedure
and cannot change substantive law that existed before its enactment. Dillard v. Smith, 146
Tex. 227, 205 S.W.2d 366, 367-68 (1947); Allright Auto Park v. Commercial Standard Ins.
Co., 220 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1949, no writ).
62. E.g., Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo, 254 F.2d 171, 173-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 827 (1958) (court allowed suit against partnership as entity under rule 28 although only
three of ten partners were named as individual defendants; court found naming individual
partners as defendants necessary only for purposes of making them individually liable for part-
nership obligations); J.A. & E.D. Transp. Co. v. Rusin, 202 S.W.2d 693, 695-96 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio), modified on other grounds sub nom. Dillard v. Smith, 146 Tex. 227, 205
S.W.2d 366, 368 (1947) (rule 28 requires according a partnership entity status with regard to
enforcing judgment against it); Mims Bros. v. N.A. James, Inc., 174 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin), writ ref'd per curiam, 175 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1943) (same; in addition, the
court noted that partnership judgment remains unenforceable against a partner who is not
subject to personal judgment).
63. Johnson v. Pioneer Mortgage Co., 264 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1954, writ dism'd). But see Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1951), afftd, 195
F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952). In Coast the district court held that
Louisiana partnership law, which recognizes partnerships as entities, requires filing of a suit on
a partnership's claim in the partnership name "through or by" all partners. 96 F. Supp. at 58-
59.
64. Johnson v. Pioneer Mortgage Co., 264 S.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1954, writ dism'd).
65. 544 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. Id. at 715.
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suit naming one partner as a plaintiff and the other partner as a defendant. 67
The Spiritas court did not discuss the applicability of rule 28. In Cates v.
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.68 the Fifth Circuit criticized
Spiritas and stated that joining nonsuing partners as defendants to permit
suits by fewer than all partners on partnership claims did not accord with
the Texas Act's strong preference for the entity theory.69 The Fifth Circuit
also noted that an individual partner who lacks the consent of the majority
generally may not sue in the name of the partnership or in his own name for
a proportional part of the partnership cause of action. 70
III. DEVELOPMENT OF DERIVATIVE SUITS IN TRUSTS, CORPORATIONS,
AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
A. Trust Beneficiaries' and Shareholders' Derivative Suits
A trustee has a fiduciary relationship with the trust beneficiary. 71 This
relationship imposes duties on the trustee, including a duty to manage the
trust exclusively for the benefit of the beneficiary. 72 A trustee must, there-
fore, make reasonable efforts to enforce causes of action that he holds for the
trust.7 3 When a trustee unreasonably refuses to sue on a valid claim, courts
allow the beneficiary to bring an equitable action against the trustee to force
him to institute suit against the third party.74
Directors' abuse of corporations under their control provided the impetus
67. Id. at 714-15.
68. 756 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 1176. The Fifth Circuit previously rejected joinder of a nonsuing partner as a
defendant in Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
In Coast, after finding that one partner could not sue on a partnership cause of action under
Louisiana law, which recognizes partnerships as entities, the court rejected the plaintiffs at-
tempts to join the nonsuing partner as a defendant. 195 F.2d 871-72. The court stated that
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)
relates tojoinder of parties, it permits a plaintiff under proper circumstances to
require another person or persons to join with him, but it makes no provision for
a plaintiff to require another person to maintain an action vested solely in such
other person, even though its maintenance might result in benefit to the plaintiff.
Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d at 872 (emphasis in original); see also Grant County Deposit
Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 1952) (diversity case rejecting classification
as defendant of partner who refuses to sue). But see Rose v. Beckham, 264 Ala. 209, 86 So. 2d
275, 277 (1956) (if one partner refuses to join in suit for partnership claim other partners may
name him as co-plaintiff if they indemnify him against costs).
70. 756 F.2d at 1176; see Stevens v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 722, 381 N.Y.S.2d 927,
928 (1976) (one partner cannot sue for his proportional share of payments under defendant's
contract with partnership because all partners jointly own cause of action).
71. A. ScoTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (1960). Additional fiduci-
aries include corporate directors or officers and partners. Id.
72. Id.
73. A. ScoTr, supra note 71, § 177. A trustee who fails to pursue a cause of action bears
the burden of proving the reasonableness of his action. If the trustee cannot prove the reasona-
bleness of his action, he becomes liable for any resulting loss. Id. Ordinarily the trustee has
the exclusive right to pursue a trust's claim even though the beneficiary's interest in the trust is
also impaired. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 869,
at 87 (rev. 2d ed. 1982) (hereinafter cited as BOGERT].
74. 4 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 282.1 (3d ed. 1967). The beneficiary cannot
force the trustee to sue if the court finds the trustee's refusal to be reasonable.
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for development of a shareholders' action against corporate management. 75
Courts originally allowed shareholder actions against directors by imposing
a trustee's fiduciary obligations on directors and permitting representative
stockholder's actions against directors who breached their trusts. 76 The rep-
resentative trustee-beneficiary theory could not, however, permit a share-
holder's suit against a third party on a claim arising from corporate
transactions with the third party because the third party had no fiduciary
obligation to the shareholder. Courts, recognizing the need to provide a
remedy, developed the derivative theory to enable shareholders to reach
third-party defendants who are outside of corporate management.
In Dodge v. Woolsey77 the Supreme Court permitted a shareholder action
against a third party. 78 The Court found the required breach of fiduciary
duty in the directors' refusal to comply with the shareholder's demands for
suit on an admittedly valid corporate claim arising from an illegal state
tax.79 The Court did not, however, articulate a theoretical rationale for al-
lowing the shareholder to proceed against the third party, a state tax collec-
tor, in lieu of requiring a separate action by the normal plaintiff, the
corporation. 80
The concept of a derivative action provides the necessary theoretical ra-
tionale for the action allowed in the Dodge case.8s Two somewhat counter-
vailing ideas appear in the Dodge situation. First, the corporation
constitutes an entity with its own legal rights. Second, the shareholders may
require judicial protection when their interests are jeopardized by the direc-
tors' default. The theory of the shareholders' suit as a secondary or deriva-
tive suit8 2 on the corporate entity's cause of action provides the necessary
integration of the corporation's rights and the shareholders' needs and al-
lows the shareholders to proceed against third parties.83
75. Prunty, The Shareholders'Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV.
980, 980 (1957).
76. Id. at 986; Comment, supra note 17, at 1467-69.
77. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856). See generally 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.15[1], at 12-14 (rev. 2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as 3B MOORE]
(discussing Dodge); Prunty, supra note 75, at 991-92 (same).
78. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 345-46. The shareholder also named the directors and the cor-
poration as defendants. Id. at 336.
79. Id. at 345.
80. The Court merely found a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors and stated that the
directors "were properly made parties to the bill, and that the jurisdiction of a court of equity
reaches such a case to give such a remedy as its circumstances may require." Id. The Court
then addressed and rejected the tax collector's assertion that the suit by the shareholder, as
opposed to a suit by the corporation, constituted a contrivance to obtain diversity jurisdiction.
Id. at 346. After Dodge a widespread use of shareholder actions to obtain diversity jurisdiction
resulted in the FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 requirement that the shareholder state in a verified com-
plaint that the derivative action is not a collusive attempt to obtain diversity jurisdiction.
81. Prunty, supra note 75, at 991-92.
82. Payment of any judgment recovered to the corporation reinforces the secondary na-
ture of derivative actions. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 358, at 1037 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as HENN].
83. Prunty, supra note 75, at 992. The shareholder's derivative action has undergone
substantial changes durings its development. For a discussion of modem actions see HENN,




Subsequently, courts also allowed trust beneficiaries to join third parties as
additional defendants in their equitable actions against trustees who refused
to sue on a trust claim. 84 The courts justified the joinder by the necessity of
protecting the beneficiary's interests.85 Specifically, to require the benefici-
ary to wait for a court order that compels the trustee to institute suit could
result in additional injury to the beneficiary's equitable interest in the trust
property due to a change in the ability of the third party to satisfy the claim
or to preclusion of the claim by a statute of limitation or laches.86 Courts
also justified the joinder on grounds of judicial efficiency by noting that join-
der allowed resolution of the controversy in a single action.
8 7
A derivative suit includes two separate causes of action: the first against
the party who impermissibly declines to sue, and the second against the third
party who is liable to the entity.88 A derivative action, therefore, is only
appropriate if the shareholder or trust beneficiary pursues a cause of action
that belongs to the entity as opposed to an entirely individual claim. 89 The
distinction between entity and individual claims has often proved difficult.90
Generally, however, only the entity possesses the right to sue for injury to or
interference with the entity's business or contracts, although the individual
shareholder, beneficiary, or partner also suffers damages through loss of
earnings or diminution in the value of his investment. 91
B. Limited Partners' Derivative Suits
The development of derivative suits in limited partnerships occurred
84. Prunty, supra note 75, at 991-92; see Klebanow v. Funston, 35 F.R.D. 518, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
85. BOGERT, supra note 73, § 869, at 92.
86. Id.
87. 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 74, § 282.1.
88. See Riveria Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 548, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880,
277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392-93 (1966) (discussing separate causes of action in trust context).
89. 3B MOORE, supra note 77, 23.1.161]. Examples of derivative claims include claims
against officers or controlling stockholders for mismanagement or attempts to recover property
of the corporation or to pursue corporate claims. Id. See 1 R. MAGNUSON, supra note 83,
§ 8.04 (discussing typical situations giving rise to derivative actions). Examples of individual
claims include suits on contracts between the corporation and a shareholder or suits by a
shareholder to recover a debt owed him by the corporation. 3B MOORE, supra note 76,
23.1.161].
90. 3B MOORE, supra note 77, 23.1.16[l].
91. E.g., McDonald v. Bennett, 674 F.2d 1080, 1086 (5th Cir. 1982) (under Texas law
even majority shareholder cannot sue for damages incurred by corporation); Pitchford v. Pepi,
Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976) (president and stockholder
could not sue under Sherman Act for injuries to corporation); Mendenhall v. Fleming Co., 504
F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 1974) (Sherman Act antitrust action belongs to corporation; share-
holder cannot sue for damages that result from sale of stock at depressed price or on corpora-
tion's antitrust claim); Schaffer v. Universal Rundle Corp., 397 F.2d 893, 896-97 (5th Cir.
1968) (plaintiff must show breach of duty owed to himself as individual stockholder before he
can sue in contract or tort for injury to corporation's business); Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d
844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957) (corporation, not stockholder, is entitled to recover on injury to cor-
porate business even if stockholder also suffers damages); Seidman & Seidman v. Schwartz,
665 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ dism'd) (under Texas Act's entity
theory, partnership owns causes of action for injury to partnership; partners' individual inter-
ests in cause of action, if any, are subordinate to partnership's rights).
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much later than the analogous developments in trusts and corporations. For
this reason and because limited partnerships more closely resemble general
partnerships, this Comment reviews the limited partnership development in
greater detail. Unlike partnerships, but like corporations, limited partner-
ships remain statutory creations. 92 Twenty-seven states continue to apply
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA)93 that the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Law promulgated in 1916.
Twenty-two states have adopted the 1976 revision of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (RULPA). 94
Primarily due to their combination of limited liability and favorable tax
attributes, the number of limited partnerships has increased dramatically in
recent decades. 95 Although small businesses commonly employed the lim-
ited partnership vehicle in the last century, 96 many of these new generation
partnerships include large numbers of partners and invest in speculative ar-
eas such as oil and gas and real estate.97 Because a limited partner must, by
definition, remain a passive investor in the partnership, 98 and because mod-
em limited partnerships are often large and general partners frequently do
not have personal relationships with limited partners, a separation of capital
(provided by the limited partners) from management and control (in the
92. Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197, 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (1953).
93. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1916), 6 U.L.A. 561 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
U.L.P.A.]. The following states continue to use the ULPA: Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. 6
U.L.A. 147 (Supp. 1985). The District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands also continue to
use the ULPA. Id.
Various states adopted limited partnership statutes before the ULPA. These state statutes,
however, contained very rigid requirements, and courts construed the statutes narrowly. Lim-
ited partnerships, therefore, remained relatively undeveloped until the adoption of the ULPA.
See generally Hecker, supra note 14, at 343, (discussing civil law origins and early state stat-
utes); Taubman, Limited Partnerships, CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1962, at 15, 15-19
(same); Comment, supra note 17, at 1463-64 (same).
94. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 216 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as R.U.L.P.A.]. The following states have adopted the RULPA to replace the ULPA:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 6 U.L.A. 200 (Supp.
1985). Although Louisiana has never adopted the ULPA or RULPA, it has under its civil law
system recognized a partnership in commendam. See generally Comment, An Examination of
Louisiana Limited Partnership-The Partnership in Commendam, 55 TUL. L. REV. 515, 515-
16 (1980) (discussing revisions in Louisiana partnership law).
95. Hecker, supra note 14, at 344.
96. Taubman, supra note 93, at 38 (also noting that limited partnerships may prove useful
in such businesses currently, projecting continued substantial usage in certain fields and dis-
cussing reasons for using limited partnerships).
97. See generally Hecker, supra note 14, at 343-44 (discussing tax aspects and recent usage
of limited partnerships); Comment, supra note 17, at 1467 (also noting that prohibition of
incorporation of certain businesses and partnership's lack of mandatory corporate formalities
contribute to the popularity of limited partnerships).
98. U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916) provides that a limited partner foregoes limited liability if he
"takes part in the control of the business." Id. § 9 gives the general partners the same manage-
ment authority as a partner in a partnership under the Act.
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hands of the general partners) results.99 This separation may tempt general
partners to engage in mismanagement and self-dealing. 100
The ULPA provides only two remedies for limited partners: (1) the right
to compel an accounting;' 0 and (2) the right to request dissolution of the
limited partnership under a court order.102 A shareholder's ability to force
corporate dissolution, however, did not prevent development of shareholder
derivative actions. The similar powers of limited partners thus should not
defeat the development of partnership derivative actions in appropriate
circumstances. 10 3
1. Judicially Developed Limited Partner Derivative Suits. Courts in several
states have developed procedures for derivative suits to provide an additional
remedy to limited partners. 1 4 Courts have limited the availability of the
derivative suit remedy to situations in which the general partner has refused
99. Hecker, supra note 14, at 344 (noting similarity to corporations); Comment, supra
note 17, at 1478 (also noting that separation of capital ownership from control constituted one
factor leading to development of derivative suit remedy for corporate shareholders).
100. See, e.g., Bedolla v. Logan & Frazier, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 124, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63-
64 (1975) (general partners engaged in self-dealing and received unauthorized compensation);
Executive Hotels Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 354, 245 N.Y.S.2d 929, 933-34 (Civ.
Ct.) (general partners executed series of transactions that transferred all interest of limited
partnerships in its only asset, a lease, to the general partners' corporations), affid mem., 43
Misc. 2d 153, 250 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Starr v. Int'l Realty, Ltd., 271 Or. 396, 533
P.2d 165, 169 (1975) (general partner realized excessive syndication fees); Comment, supra
note 17, at 1478 (recognizing potential mismanagement of self-dealing from separation of capi-
tal and management).
101. U.L.P.A. § 10(l)(b) (1916). For discussion of accounting actions under the Act, see
supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
102. U.L.P.A. § 10(l)(c) (1916). For discussion of judicial dissolution under the Act, see
supra text accompanying notes 19-23. Dissolution in a limited partnership may have particu-
larly egregious tax consequences when allowable deductions have exceeded capital invested
due to the use of nonrecourse debt. Note, Procedures and Remedies in Limited Partners' Suits
for Breach of the General Partner's Fiduciary Duty, 90 HARV. L. REV. 763, 780-83 (1977).
103. Comment, supra note 17, at 1480. A limited partner's ability to obtain court-ordered
and supervised dissolution should not preclude derivative action in proper circumstances be-
cause derivative action is a quicker and better remedy. Klebanow v. New York Produce
Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1965).
104. See, e.g., Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1965)
(applying New York law, court found derivative suit allowable when general partner imper-
missibly will not or cannot sue), rev'g 232 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Wroblewski v.
Brucher, 550 F. Supp. 742, 748-49 n.8 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (discussing California law, which
permits limited partner derivative suits); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1152-53 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (permitted limited partner derivative suit under Pennsylvania law); Smith v. Bader, 458
F. Supp. 1184, 1186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (derivative suit permitted under California law); Kle-
banow v. Funston, 35 F.R.D. 518, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (applying New York law, court found
derivative suit allowable where general partner impermissibly will not or cannot sue); McCully
v. Radack, 27 Md. App. 350, 340 A.2d 374, 379-80 (1975) (permitting intervention by limited
partners and approving, in dictum, limited partners' derivative actions); Riviera Congress As-
socs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391 (1966)
(limited partners could sue on partnership claim because general partner impermissibly refused
to sue). See generally Comment, Limited Partnerships-Derivative Actions-Ability of Limited
Partner to Institute a Partnership's Cause of Action, 50 IOWA L. REV. 954 (1965) (criticizing
district court's decision in Klebanow); Comment, Partnership-Limited Partnership-Limited
Partners Held Able to Sue Third Parties on Behalf of Partnership When General Partners Are
Unable or Improperly Refuse to Sue, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174 (1965) (discussing Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Klebanow in detail).
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to sue on behalf of the partnership or has become incapable of suing for the
partnership. 0 5 The courts relied on analogies in their analyses of the issue.
Parties who oppose derivative suits compare limited partners to creditors,
who cannot maintain derivative actions. 10 6 Parties who seek approval of
such derivative actions rely on the similarities between limited partners and
corporate shareholders or trust beneficiaries, both of whom can maintain
derivative actions. 107
The limited partner characteristics that one can cite in support of the
creditor analogy include: (1) the absence of a property right in partnership
assets;' 08 (2) the preference received in asset distribution;' 0 9 and (3) the pro-
hibition on inclusion of a limited partner's name in the partnership name. 110
Courts have not, however, found the creditor analogy to be convincing."1
In fact, the first creditor characteristic, the absence of a property right in
partnership assets, can also be employed in an analogy to a corporate stock-
holder.112 Furthermore, the second creditor characteristic, the preference
105. E.g., Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1965) (court
should require "strong allegations and proof of disqualification or wrongful refusal;" a simple
disagreement should not suffice); Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F. Supp. 742, 748 n.8 (W.D.
Okla. 1982) (in cases of fraud or collusion limited partners can institute a derivative suit or
intervene in an existing action); Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 547, 223
N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 368, 391 (1966) (limited partners' derivative suits allowed if general
partners impermissibly decline to sue); Executive Hotel Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc.
2d 354, 245 N.Y.S.2d 929, 933-34 (Civ. Ct.) (limited partners allowed to initiate derivative suit
to recover from general partners who refused to collect rent owed to limited partnership by
corporation that the general partners controlled; court found general partners breached their
fiduciary duty and violated provisions of the partnership agreement), afl'd mer., 43 Misc. 2d
153, 250 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See generally Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48
IOWA L. REV. 902, 906-07 (1963) (partner's duty of care evaluated by good faith-gross negli-
gence standard, but much more stringent standard applies to violations of a partner's duty of
loyalty).
106. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965).
107. See generally id. (discussing analogies to creditors, shareholders, and trust benefi-
ciaries); Klebanow v. Funston, 35 F.R.D. 518, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (limited partners' position
comparable to position of trust beneficiaries); Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528,
536, 223 N.E.2d 869, 873, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 382 (1966) (discussing analogy between limited
partner and shareholder); Hecker, supra note 14, at 350-51 (discussing analogies to sharehold-
ers and trust beneficiaries); Comment, supra note 17, at 1476-81 (discussing analogies to credi-
tors, shareholders, and trust beneficiaries and justifying such reliance based on absence of
statutory or judicial direction).
108. A general partner in a limited partnership has the same rights and powers as any
partner in a general partnership under the Act. U.L.P.A. § 9(1) (1916). Under the Act a
partner's property rights include a co-ownership interest in the partnership property as a ten-
ant in partnership, id. §§ 24, 25, and a personal property interest in the partnership, which is
his proportionate part of its profits and surplus, id. §§ 24, 26. A limited partner, however, has
only a personal property interest in the partnership. Id. §§ 10, 18.
109. Id. § 23. Creditors, however, have preference over limited partners. Id.
110. Id. §5.
111. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965); see Com-
ment, supra note 17, at 1476-78 (discussing cases involving analogy between limited partners
and creditors in other contexts).
112. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1965); see Com-
ment, supra note 17, at 1476-78 (concluding that classification of limited partners as creditors
based on their lack of rights in partnership assets would also require classification of share-




received in asset distribution, parallels the preference that preferred stock-
holders receive. 113
The limited partner characteristics that support the shareholder analogy
include: (1) participation in profits;' 14 (2) subordination to creditors in asset
distribution;' 15 (3) the power to veto admission of new partners;"16 (4) the
privileges of examining the partnership books and demanding information
regarding the partnership; 1 7 (5) limitation of liability for partnership debts
to the amount of investment; 118 and (6) the lack of participation in manage-
ment. 119 These similarities led one court to refer to limited partnerships as
"quasi-corporate" entities and to describe limited partners as "quasi-share-
holders."' 120 In the corporate context directors and majority stockholders
have a fiduciary duty to conduct the corporation's business and manage its
assets in view of the best interests of all of its shareholders.' 2 1 Courts of
equity originally recognized derivative actions to protect shareholders' inter-
ests that no legal or equitable remedy protected.122 General partners have a
fiduciary duty to limited partners that is comparable to the fiduciary duty
that a corporate director owes to a corporate shareholder. 123 Absent a sub-
stantive distinction that justifies denying the derivative suit remedy in the
limited partnership context, a limited partner should have the remedy just as
a corporate shareholder does. 124
The courts encountered four fundamental problems in the development of
the derivative suit remedy for limited partners under the ULPA: (a) the ne-
cessity of according entity status to partnerships at least for certain pur-
poses; (b) the absence of any provision that authorizes partners' derivative
suits; (c) the provision in ULPA section 26 that limited partners do not gen-
erally constitute proper parties in actions by or against a partnership; and
(d) the potential loss of limited liability if instituting a derivative suit consti-
tutes sharing management and control of the business under section 7 of the
113. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1965).
114. U.L.P.A. § 10(2) (1916).
115. Id. § 23(1).
116. Id. § 17(4).
117. Id. § 10(1)(a), (b).
118. Id. §§ 7, 17.
119. Id. §7.
120. Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (1953). But see Taubman,
supra note 93, at 21-24. Taubman contends that substantive differences exist between limited
partners and shareholders, particularly as to ability to exercise control.
121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
123. Miller v. Schweickart, 405 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (general partner's fidu-
ciary duty to limited partner not inferior to that of a corporate director to a shareholder);
Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 548, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d
386, 392 (1966) (clearly general partner has fiduciary duty to limited partners); Lichtyger v.
Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 536, 223 N.E.2d 869, 873-74, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 384 (1966)
(business control of either corporation or partnership engenders duty of fair dealing with other
investors).
124. Comment, supra note 17, at 1479; see Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528,
537, 223 N.E.2d 869, 874, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 384 (1966) (illogical to allow shareholders to
bring derivative suits, but not limited partners); Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197-98, 111
N.E.2d 878, 881 (1953) (limited partner's situation corresponds with corporate shareholder's).
1038 [Vol. 39
ULPA. 125 The following paragraphs discuss each of these obstacles in
detail.
a. Entity Status. A partnership derivative action, by definition, involves
one person or entity pursuing a cause of action belonging to another person
or entity. 126 Recognition of limited partners' derivative suits, therefore, re-
quires treatment of limited partnerships as entities at least for certain pur-
poses. The ULPA contains a combination of provisions attributable to the
entity and aggregate theories, similar to the combination found in the
Act. 127 Courts often treat a limited partnership, like a general partnership,
as an entity at least for some purposes. 128 Courts have not found the partial
aggregate nature of partnerships a bar to limited partners' derivative
actions. 129
b. Absence of ULPA Authorization. Derivative actions in trusts and cor-
porations originated in courts of equity without any prior statutory authori-
zation. The actions originated from a demonstrated need that no previously
recognized remedy met. 130 The ULPA provides only two statutory reme-
dies, accounting and judicial dissolution. Both remedies may prove to be
inadequate.13' Although a few courts have rejected derivative suits in lim-
ited partnerships because of the absence of statutory authority, 132 other
courts have permitted the suits even without statutory authority. 133 Consid-
125. See Hecker, supra note 14, at 346-55.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 40-56, discussing the aggregate and entity charac-
teristics of general partnerships organized under the Act. The ULPA does not include com-
prehensive provisions on all aspects of partnership operation that are comparable to the
provisions of the Act. The entity characteristics discussed supra in notes 45-48 are apparently
included in limited partnerships, however, because the Act governs in cases not provided for in
the ULPA. ULPA § 29 (1916). Section 1 of the ULPA defines a limited partnership as "a
partnership formed by two or more persons under the provisions of Section 2, having as mem-
bers one or more general partners and one or more limited partners." Id. § 1. The ULPA
thus incorporates the Act's aggregate definition. Under id. § 7 a limited partner does not
become personally liable to the partnership's creditors unless he shares in management and
control of the business. Limited liability is often viewed as an entity characteristic. A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 13, at 29.
128. Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197, 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (partnership treated as
legal entity for pleading purposes under procedural rule allowing partnership to sue or be sued
in the partnership name); Mims Bros. v. N.A. James, Inc., 174 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin), writ ref'd per curiam, 175 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1943) (partnership treated as entity
with regard to enforcing judgment against it or obtaining judgment for it under similar proce-
dural rule).
129. See Miller v. Schweickart, 405 F. Supp. 366, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court permitted
derivative suit because limited partnership constituted entity under state law); Riviera Con-
gress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 546, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391
(1966) (permitting derivative suit under procedural rule allowing suit in partnership name).
130. See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
132. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 282 F. Supp. 965, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd,
344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965); Hauer V. Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 1, 4 (E.D. Wis.
1974); Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D.2d 333, 336-37, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258-59 (1966).
But see Cates v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1178 (5th Cir. 1985) (criticiz-
ing Hauer).
133. See, e.g., Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1965)
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ering the history of judicial development in trusts and corporations and the
equitable needs in a proper case, permitting derivative suits even without
specific statutory authority seems advisable.1 34
c. Section 26 Bar on Limited Partners as Parties to Actions. Section 26 of
the ULPA provides that a limited partner does not constitute a proper party
to partnership litigation unless the partnership sues to enforce a claim
against the limited partner or the limited partner sues to enforce a claim
against the partnership. 35 Although the drafters of the ULPA apparently
did not consider the effect of section 26 on limited partners' derivative
suits,' 36 the literal terms of the section might prohibit actions by a limited
partner against the partnership, as nominal defendant, to enforce a partner-
ship cause of action. 137 If one views a limited partner's derivative suit as an
action to enforce a limited partner's rights against a mismanaging general
partner, however, the action could fit within the express exception that sec-
tion 26 provides. 138
In Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange139 the Second Circuit found
the original purposes of section 26 to be fairly clear.14° Under the section
general partners can sue on partnership claims without joinder of the limited
partners. Furthermore, section 26 allows third parties to sue the partnership
without naming parties who are not subject to personal liability, or the lim-
ited partners, as defendants.14 ' The court noted that section 26 could bar
(applying New York law, court found derivative suit allowable when general partner imper-
missibly will not or cannot sue), rev'g 232 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Engl v. Berg, 511 F.
Supp. 1146, 1152-53 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (permitted limited partner derivative suit under Penn-
sylvania law); Smith v. Bader, 458 F. Supp. 1184, 1186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (derivative suit
permitted under California law); Klebanow v. Funston, 35 F.R.D. 518, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (derivative suit permitted although defendant pleaded lack of statutory authority).
134. See generally Hecker, supra note 14, at 349-50 (discussing effect of absence of statu-
tory authority).
135. U.L.P.A. § 26 (1916) provides that a limited partner "is not a proper party to pro-
ceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a limited partner's
right against or liability to the partnership."
136. See Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1965). The
court noted that even the party arguing that N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115 (McKinney 1948)
(current version at §§ 115-a to -c (McKinney Supp. 1984)) bars derivative suits did not ear-
nestly assert that the drafters of the Act or the New York legislature considered the section's
effect on such actions. Klebanow, 344 F.2d at 298-99. Before its amendment, § 115 was identi-
cal to § 26 of the Act. The amendment codified derivative actions. See infra note 160 and
accompanying text.
137. Hecker, supra note 14, at 352; see Kobernick v. Shaw, 70 Cal. App. 3d 914, 920, 139
Cal. Rptr. 188, 191 (1977) (limited partner unable to bring suit on behalf of partnership under
CAL. CORP. CODE § 15526 (West 1977), identical to U.L.P.A. § 26, but could intervene be-
cause general partner refused to defend); Lieberman v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Wash. 2d
922, 385 P.2d 53, 56 (1963) (limited partners cannot institute suit on partnership's cause of
action under WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.08.260 (1969), identical to U.L.P.A. § 26 (re-
pealed in 1982 with adoption of R.U.L.P.A. (Supp. 1985)).
138. Hecker, supra note 14, at 352 n.57.
139. 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965).
140. Id. at 298.
141. Id. This interpretation of § 26 accords with New York law before enactment of the
ULPA. Id. See Hecker, supra note 14, at 352-53 (suggesting a similar interpretation of § 26);
Comment, supra note 17, at 1473 (discussing Klebanow court's interpretation).
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suits by limited partners, which suits would usually constitute impermissible
participation in operation of the partnership, but found no reason to con-
strue the section as a bar to suit by limited partners when the general partner
could not or would not pursue the partnership's claim. 142 In Smith v.
Bader143 the district court, applying California law, noted that section 29 of
the ULPA I44 provides that common law and equitable principles prevail in
any case that is not addressed by the ULPA. I45 The Smith court found that
section 26146 does not specifically proscribe a derivative suit and held that
equity weighed against strictly interpreting section 26 to bar the action. 147
Other courts have reached the same conclusion. 148
d. Potential Loss of Limited Liability. Section 7 of the ULPA provides
that a limited partner continues to enjoy limited liability if he does not par-
ticipate in the control of the partnership. 149 A question exists as to whether
filing a derivative action constitutes participation in the control of the ven-
ture. The small number of cases on point have not resolved this issue.150
Courts and commentators disagree on both the proper role of section 7
and an appropriate test to determine whether a limited partner's acts violate
the section. 151 The majority of courts that have addressed the issue appear
to have decided the control question on the basis of facts peculiar to each
case without providing any clear test. 152 Some courts have concluded that
142. 344 F.2d at 298.
143. 458 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
144. The court applied CAL. CORP. CODE § 15529 (West 1977), identical to U.L.P.A. § 29
(1916).
145. 458 F. Supp. at 1186, citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 15529 (West 1977), identical to
U.L.P.A. § 29 (1916).
146. The court applied CAL. CORP. CODE § 15526 (West 1977), which was identical to
U.L.P.A. § 26 (1916).
147. 458 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
148. Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1152-53 (E.D. Pa. 1981); McCully v. Radack, 27
Md. App. 350, 340 A.2d 374, 379-80 (1975); Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d
540, 546, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391 (1966).
149. U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916) provides that "[a] limited partner shall not become liable as a
general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner,
he takes part in the control of the business."
150. See Bedolla v. Logan & Frazier, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 128, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 66-67
(1975) (although filing action on partnership claim usually renders limited partner liable as
general partner, under CAL. CORP. CODE § 15526 (West 1977), which is identical to U.L.P.A.
§ 26 (1916), limited partner may sue general partners or partnership and may join conspiring
third parties without losing limited liability); McCully v. Radack, 27 Md. App. 350, 340 A.2d
374, 380 (1975) (reserving the question); Executive Hotel Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc.
2d 354, 358-59, 245 N.Y.S.2d 929, 933 (Civ. Ct.), (limited partner who commenced suit chose
to "act as general partner," triggering liability under section 7), aff'd mem., 43 Misc. 2d 153,
250 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See generally Hecker, supra note 14, at 353-54 (discussing
decisions); Note, supra note 102, at 775-77 (discussing decisions). New York amended N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP LAW § 96 (McKinney 1948 & Supp. 1984), which was previously identical to
U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916). Under the amended version of § 96, instituting a derivative suit does not
trigger liability as a general partner.
151. Feldman, The Limited Partner's Participation in the Control of the Partnership Busi-
ness, 50 CONN. B.J. 168, 168 (1976).
152. Id. at 190; see Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 54, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1961)
(control constitutes question of fact), affid, 301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1962); J.C. Wattenbarger &
Sons v. Saunders, 216 Cal. App. 2d 495, 500-01, 30 Cal. Rptr. 910, 914 (1963) (trial court
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section 7 only imposes personal liability if the limited partner's action results
in deception of or reliance by a third party. 53 Other courts do not infer a
reliance element. 154 Viewing section 7 as either a penalty for unjustified
meddling in management'5 5 or an appropriate allocation of responsibility for
loss of partnership assets 56 can justify the absence of a reliance element.
Logically, however, regardless of the interpretation chosen, filing a deriva-
tive action should not result in liability under section 7.157 The Commission
stated that a limited partner may have some control of the partnership's
activities without incurring personal liability, 158 and the courts have im-
posed liability under section 7 only in cases of more repetitive acts of
control. 159
2. Statutory Limited Partner Derivative Suits. Two states, Delaware and
New York, 160 codified a limited partner's right to bring a derivative suit.
decides whether facts are legally sufficient to justify belief that defendant assumed liability of
general partner).
153. Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch Enters., 70 Cal. App. 3d 714, 729, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 918, 926-27 (1977); Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1974), rev'd, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union
Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400, 562 P.2d 244, 247 (1977); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d
394, 218 P.2d 757, 764 (1950); see Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1479-84 (1969) (criticizing lack of clear control test, finding reliance
interpretation most convincing and recommending reconsideration of U.L.P.A. § 7); 26
WASH. L. REV. 222 (1951) (discussing Rathke).
154. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. 1975). Under the previous
version of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (Vernon 1970) (current version at art.
6132a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1986)) the court found that a partner exercising control becomes
personally liable and that reliance did not constitute a necessary element under the statute.
Before amendment art. 6132a, § 8 duplicated U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916). The amended statute spe-
cifically requires reliance as a condition to imposition of liability. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132a, § 8(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986). See Holzman v. De Escamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d 858,
195 P.2d 833, 834 (1948) (not mentioning reliance, court held limited partners liable as general
partners for withdrawal of partnership funds from bank account and for removal and selection
of partnership manager). See generally Note, Liability of Limited Partners Participating in the
Management of the Sole Corporate General Partner-Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 29 Sw.
L.J. 791 (1975) (criticizing decision and noting that limited partners now face danger of per-
sonal liability in partnerships with a sole corporate general partner even when the corporate
general partner is adequately capitalized); Note, Limited Partnerships-Limited Partners Who
Control Corporate General Partner Are Subject to Personal Liability as General Partners, Dela-
ney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S. W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975), 7 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 745 (1976)
(intent of ULPA drafters and legislature correctly implemented by decision, including exer-
cises through corporate partner within definition of control).
155. Comment, Partnership-Limited Partnership--Limited Partners Held Able to Sue
Third Parties on Behalf of Partnership When General Partners are Unable or Improperly Refuse
to Sue, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174, 1178-79 (1965) (purpose of U.L.P.A. § 7 is punitive because
the New York equivalents of U.L.P.A. §§ 5 and 6 provide adequate protection for creditors).
156. Hecker, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act.: Provisions Affecting the Relationship of
the Firm and Its Members to Third Parties, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 47-52 (1978).
157. Hecker, supra note 14, at 354. Deception or reliance by a third party appears un-
likely, and if courts appropriately limit derivative suits, the suits will result in only justifiable
interference without the likelihood of loss of partnership assets. Id.
158. U.L.P.A. § 1, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. 564 (1969); see Hecker, supra note 156, at
47 (noting that Official Comment may contradict U.L.P.A. § 7).
159. Hecker, supra note 14, at 354.
160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1732 (1974) (repealed in 1982 in connection with adoption
of the R.U.L.P.A. (Supp. 1985)); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 115-a to -c (McKinney 1984).
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Article 10 of the RULPA,16' currently in force in twenty-two states, 162 also
codifies a limited partner's right to a derivative action and includes many
provisions that are also either found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.1163 or drawn from corporate law. 164 The RULPA permits a derivative
suit on a partnership cause of action if: (1) the general partners have refused
to institute a suit on a partnership cause of action; or (2) the general partners
probably would not agree to sue upon the limited partners' request.' 65 The
recovery, if any, belongs to the partnership, not to the partner bringing
suit.166 Generally, only a member of the partnership at the time of the oc-
currence in question and at the time that the suit is instituted may bring a
derivative action. 167 Finally, the RULPA provides that a successful plaintiff
may recover his expenses.168
IV. DERIVATIVE SUITS IN PARTNERSHIPS UNDER THE ACT
In Cates v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. 169 the Fifth Circuit
suggested that in an extraordinary situation Texas courts might allow a mi-
nority partner to bring a derivative action on behalf of his partnership.1
70
The court noted that trust beneficiaries and stockholders may initiate deriva-
tive suits. 17 1 Apparently borrowing from the analysis that courts used to
allow limited partners' derivative actions, 172 the court analogized partners
and shareholders and noted that under the Texas Act a partnership interest
closely resembles a share of corporate stock or a trust beneficiary's interest in
the trust corpus. 173
161. R.U.L.P.A. §§ 1001-1004 (Supp. 1985). See generally Hecker, supra note 14, at 355-
74 (discussing application of the RULPA provisions); Reuschlein, Limited Partner Derivative
Suits, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 443, 455-57 (1978) (same).
162. See supra note 94.
163. Reuschlein, supra note 161, at 455-57.
164. Kessler, The New Uniform Limited Partnership Act.- A Critique, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 159, 182 (1979). Professor Kessler also notes that article 10 does not fully incorporate
corporate law, particularly with regard to: (1) a provision requiring a suing partner with a
small partnership interest to post a security to pay for defendant general partner's expenses if
the partner's claim proves meritless; (2) a provision to indemnify successful defendant general
partners; and (3) a provision mandating court approval of settlements. Id. at 183.
165. R.U.L.P.A. § 1001 (Supp. 1985). Section 1003 provides that "the complaint shall set
forth with particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a general
partner or the reasons for not making the effort." Id. § 1003.
166. Id. § 1001.
167. Id. § 1002. Section 1002 provides an exception to the requirement that the suing
partner held his interest at the time of the occurrence in question if the suing partner's "status
as a partner had devolved upon him by operation of law or pursuant to the terms of the
partnership agreement from a person who was a partner at the time of the transaction."
168. Id. § 1004 provides that:
If a derivative action is successful, in whole or in part, or if anything is re-
ceived by the plaintiff as a result of a judgment, compromise, or settlement of an
action or claim, the court may award the plaintiff reasonable expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, and shall direct him to remit to the limited partner-
ship the remainder of those proceeds received by him.
169. 756 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1985).
170. Id. at 1178.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
173. 756 F.2d at 1178 (quoting Bromberg, supra note 1). A general partner in a partner-
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This analogy of a partnership interest appears incomplete for two reasons.
First, a partner in a partnership organized under the Act or the Texas Act
also has a right, in the form of a tenancy in partnership, in the partnership's
specific assets. 174 Second, a partner under either act also has a right to share
in the administration of the partnership. 175 Neither of these distinctions,
however, justifies denying general partners the right to bring a derivative suit
in an appropriate case.
With respect to the first distinction, neither a corporate shareholder nor a
limited partner has an interest in his entity's specific assets that is equivalent
to the general partner's tenancy in partnership. A trust beneficiary, how-
ever, has a proprietary interest in the trust assets.1 76 Thus, the additional
form or degree of ownership that general partners have in their entity's as-
sets should not constitute a reason to deny general partners the privilege of
bringing a derivative action in an appropriate case.
With respect to the second distinction, the general partner's right to share
in the administration of the partnership 177 seems comparable to a corporate
director's right to participate in corporate management. Directors who also
own stock have not, however, been barred from bringing derivative actions
merely because of their management rights as directors. To the contrary,
some states allow directors to initiate derivative actions without complying
with all of the restrictions normally placed on stockholders. 178 Similarly,
Professor Bromberg argues that a partner's ability to represent his partner-
ship provides sufficient grounds for additional liberalization of the rules gov-
erning actions by individual partners. 179 A general partner's right to share
in administration of the partnership should not, therefore, constitute a rea-
son to bar his derivative action. Indeed, if a shareholder having only a slight
ship organized under the Act has four of the six characteristics cited in support of the limited
partner and shareholder analogy. See supra text accompanying notes 114-19. Specifically, the
general partner: (1) participates in profits, U.P.A. § 18(a) (1914); (2) is subordinate to credi-
tors in asset distribution, id. § 40; (3) has the power to veto new partner admission, id. § 18(g);
and (4) has the privileges of examining the partnership books and demanding information
regarding the partnership, id. §§ 19, 20. A general partner does not have the fifth characteris-
tic noted above, limitation of liability for partnership debts to the amount of investment. Un-
limited liability does not, however, justify distinguishing general partners, see A. BROMBERG,
supra note 13, at 329, and, therefore, does not provide grounds on which to deny them the
privilege of bringing a derivative action in an appropriate case. See infra text accompanying
note 177 for discussion of the sixth limited partner characteristic noted in the shareholder
analogy above, the lack of participation in management.
174. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 24(1), 25 (Vernon 1970), identical to
U.P.A. §§ 24(1), 25 (1914).
175. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 24(3), 18(e) (Vernon 1970), identical to
U.P.A. §§ 24(3), 18(e) (1914).
176. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 13 (1937) (beneficiary has equitable interest in
trust's property); Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 433 (1935) (beneficiary has interest in trust
corpus). See generally A. ScoTr, supra note 71, § 130 (concluding beneficiary has interest in
trust property and discussing history and present character of the beneficiary's interest in the
trust property).
177. See U.P.A. § 18(e), (h) (1914).
178. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-714 (1935); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 720(b) (McKinney 1963);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.28(b) (West 1953); see 1 R. MAGNUSON, supra note 83, § 8.28
(1981 & Cum. Supp. 1985).
179. A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at 329.
[Vol. 391044
COMMENTS
interest can bring a derivative suit on a corporate cause of action, the asser-
tion that a partner, although possessing a very direct or immediate interest,
cannot do so seems incongruous.18 0 The assertion appears even more inap-
propriate if based on the fact that the partner has a direct interest.
Some courts have stated that all partners must join as plaintiffs in actions
on partnership claims to protect third party defendants from multiple ac-
tions. '8 A partner's ability to represent his partnership, however, should
justify barring additional actions by other partners should the suing partner
lose. 18 2 In addition, if the suing partner should win, the judgment should
discharge the partnership's claim. 18 3
In summary, corporate directors and majority stockholders have a fiduci-
ary duty. Courts of equity originally recognized derivative actions to protect
shareholders' interests that were unprotected by any existing remedy.
18 4
General partners have a comparable fiduciary duty to the partnership. 8 5
Absent a substantive distinction that justifies denial of the derivative suit
remedy in general partnerships, courts should permit partners to bring de-
rivative actions when equity requires, just as a corporate shareholder or di-
rector can. 
186
Prudence requires limitation of derivative actions in general partnerships
to appropriate situations. The Cates court did not specifically delineate the
circumstances that justify a derivative action. 187 The Fifth Circuit noted
that partners may not utilize the derivative remedy to resolve questions of
business judgment.18 8 The court, however, found that a conspiracy between
the majority, nonsuing partners and the third-party defendants to commit
the alleged injury, or collusion to block a partnership action contrary to the
partnership's best interests were sufficient to justify a derivative action. 189
These criteria resemble those standards articulated by the courts in develop-
180. Id. at 329-30.
181. Spiritas v. Robinowitz, 544 S.W.2d 710, 714-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Edmondson v. Carroll, 65 S.W.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1933, writ dism'd).
182. A. BROMBERG, supra note 13, at 329 n.13.
183. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 165 F. Supp. 933, 937 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (prevailing
defendants could recover costs from partnership assets and, at minimum, assets of plaintiff
partner).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
185. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 21(1) (Vernon 1970), identical to U.P.A.
§ 21 (1914), provides that:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other part-
ners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation
of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
186. See generally Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 873-74,
277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 383 (1966) (illogical to allow shareholders, but not limited partners, to
bring derivative suits); Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 197-98, 111 N.E.2d 878, 881 (1953)
(limited partner's situation corresponds with corporate shareholder's); Comment, supra note
17, at 1479 (distinction between shareholders and limited partners appropriate only if substan-
tive differences justify distinction).





ing the derivative remedy for limited partners. 190
Of the four problems that the courts encountered in the development of a
derivative suit remedy for limited partners under the ULPA, only two ap-
pear applicable to development of a derivative suit remedy for general part-
ners under the Act or the Texas Act. First, the need to accord partnerships
entity status at least for certain purposes arises. Second, the Act and the
Texas Act also lack a provision that authorizes partners' derivative suits. 19 1
1. Entity Status. As discussed above, partnerships can be treated as entities
at least for certain purposes under the ULPA and the Act.' 92 Courts have
not found the partial aggregate nature of partnerships a bar to limited part-
ners' derivative actions. 193 The partial aggregate nature should not, there-
fore, constitute a bar to general partners' derivative actions. In Cates the
Fifth Circuit, although noting the entity bias of the Texas Act in another
context, 194 did not discuss the entity question in the context of the permissi-
bility of a derivative action.
2. Absence ofAuthorization Under the Act. The Cates court noted that gen-
erally, as well as in Texas,195 stockholders' derivative suits have judicial ori-
gins.' 96 Derivative suits developed in corporations, trusts, and limited
partnerships to meet a need that previously existing remedies did not ade-
quately meet.' 9 7 The Act provides only two statutory remedies, accounting
and judicial dissolution. 198 These remedies may prove to be inadequate in
some situations. The potential inadequacy of the existing remedies and the
history of judicial development of derivative actions for corporations, trusts,
and limited partnerships support the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that statu-
tory authorization appears to be unnecessary.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts developed the derivative remedy for corporate shareholders, trust
beneficiaries, and limited partners to provide a remedy for injury that re-
sulted from a breach of a fiduciary duty when all preexisting remedies
proved inadequate. The courts and subsequent statutes have refined the
190. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
191. See supra text accompanying note 125. The two remaining problems encountered in
development of the derivative suit remedy for limited partners that are not applicable to gen-
eral partners derivative suits are: (I) the provisions in U.L.P.A. § 26 (1916) that limited part-
ners do not generally constitute proper parties in actions by or against a partnership; and
(2) the potential loss of limited liability if instituting a derivative suit constitutes "tak[ing] part
in the control of the business" under id. § 7.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 40-54, 126-29.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
194. 756 F.2d at 1176. For a discussion of the context of the court's reference, see supra
text accompanying notes 68-69.
195. Schwartz v. Mims, 40 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1931, writ
dism'd).
196. 756 F.2d at 1178.
197. See supra notes 71-91, 130-34, and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
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remedy to provide relief in appropriate situations, but to limit the availabil-
ity of the remedy to curb potential abuse. A general partner in a partnership
under the Act, the ULPA or the RULPA may suffer injury resulting from a
breach of the fiduciary duty owed to him by other general partners. All
preexisting remedies may prove to be inadequate. In such a situation the
equitable principles that led to development of the derivative remedy in cor-
porations, trusts, and in limited partnerships for limited partners should also
mandate that the remedy be available to a general partner.

